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Abstract
This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a
Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax
outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill−model of optimal income taxation.
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The current debate on the desirability of economic integration has produced
a seemingly simple and intuitive conclusion: unfettered integration triggers
an unavoidable ”race to the bottom” in environmental standards, labor laws
and social protection. Increasing factor mobility frees corporations, investors
and workers to scour the enlarged economic union for the country where they
can earn the highest bene…ts and to move accordingly. Fearing losses of their
tax bases, nation states have little choice but to loosen their regulations and
to lower their taxes to avoid capital ‡ight and a brain drain and to lower
the social bene…ts they o¤er in order not to welcome all the world’s misery.
As a consequence, the inevitable result is a Darwinian struggle for human
and physical capital in which all other values including environmental quality
and social justice are sacri…ced upon the altar of the inevitability of economic
integration.1
Such a race-to-the-bottom hypothesis seems quite logical. However, up to
now there appears to be little supporting evidence beyond anecdotes about
the brain drain, increases in immigration by low-skilled workers, and …rms
moving to tax havens. To explain this lack of evidence, there are two com-
mon explanations. First, one needs to remember the other side of the coin:
taxation, payroll taxes, and environmental protection generate public ser-
vices, social protection, and environmental quality, all of which are valued
by many consumers and producers. Second, there might be time lags in factor
responses. Reductions in restraints on factor mobility and trade are relatively
recent and have probably not yet produced their full e¤ects. The purpose of
this paper is to suggest another reason why the race-to-the-bottom hypothe-
sis is not veri…ed. When governments have Rawlsian objectives, that is when
they give full priority to the welfare of the needy, the race to the bottom may
never get started in the …rst place.
We use a simple model to demonstrate this result. Consider an income
tax whose proceeds …nance a ‡at-rate bene…t for low-income households. The
government’s objective is to maximize this bene…t which constitutes the only
resources for the lowest income households. In autarky, the tax will simply
be the one which lies at the top of the La¤er curve. Suppose now that there
are two identical countries and that only low-income households can freely
move between them. It is obvious that the level of bene…t which can attract
1Classic papers on this are Stigler (1957) and Wildasin (1994).
1outsiders is just equal to the maximum revenue divided by the number of
recipients and that, hence, there is no room for strategic behavior. As a
consequence, in this particular example, mobility does not lower the level of
bene…ts and there is no race-to-the-bottom.
We …rst develop this result in a simple model using a general tax structure
which could be a simple linear income tax or a fully optimal nonlinear income
tax. One message we wish to present is that the e¤ects of …scal externalities
are not independent of the objective functions of governments in an economic
union. Thus, the race to the bottom is not as inevitable as some hope or
fear.
2A s i m p l e m o d e l
We consider a two-country world. In each country i (i =1 ;2); there is a
population of ns
i skilled individuals earning a wage rate w and working `i
hours. Without loss of generality we normalize ns
i so that ns
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i + ai is disposable income or consumption, and ¿i
and ai are the parameters of the linear income tax. There are nu
i unskilled
individuals who do not work because their productivity is less than their










We …rst consider the autarkic case with no mobility by either type. The
government has a Rawlsian social welfare function and thus wishes to maxi-
mize the utility of the unskilled (as long as us
i >u u
i ):
Since the unskilled do not work, the government simply maximizes the
demogrant ai …nanced by a revenue collected from the skilled population.
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i =1 =2 corresponds to the peak of the La¤er curve2.I n t h i s
particular case ¿¤
i does not depend on nu
i . With more general utility and tax
function, this would not be the case.
We now allow for mobility. We assume that the skilled individual is
immobile, while the unskilled can move between countries at zero cost. The
unskilled relocate until they receive equal utility in both countries.






: The objective function in each country is still to
maximize the utility of the unskilled residents in the jurisdiction. Given
that nu
1 + nu
2 is a constant, the objective is to maximize tax revenue from
the skilled. Hence, the tax parameter chosen in each jurisdiction will be the
same as under autarky. Thus, we …nd that the taxes levied on the skilled
population do not vary when the unskilled population becomes perfectly (or
imperfectly mobile).
There is clearly no race to the bottom. We can indeed state that migration
does not generate any race to the bottom when the amount of redistribution
would not change if autarky were reinstaured at the migration equilibrium.
When the two countries are di¤erent, migration implies equalization of utility
for the unskilled and hence, some win and some loose. If at this equilibrium,
each country was free to choose its redistribution policy without the migra-
tion threat, there would be no change.
A similar analysis would apply for the optimal nonlinear income tax (as
in Stiglitz (1982)) with a simple modi…cation. As shown in Hamilton and
Pestieau (2002), the optimal nonlinear income tax with a Rawlsian social
2Note that there may not be a peak with a more general utility function. In the case of
a quasi-linear speci…cation, this happens only when labor is perfectly inelastic (see Gahvari
(1989) for more details).
3welfare function depends on the relative proportions of the skilled and un-
skilled. For many utility functions, the unskilled do not work if the propor-
tion of skilled in the population exceeds a certain threshold. In such cases,
the tax on the skilled equalizes the utility of the skilled and unskilled, and
the utility of both types is decreasing in the fraction of unskilled. The mi-
gration equilibrium then equalizes the utilities of both skilled and unskilled
across jurisdictions.For identical jurisdictions, the optimal nonlinear income
tax under autarky is the same as with free mobility of the unskilled. For
heterogeneous jurisdictions, migration of unskilled to the jurisdiction with a
greater bene…t level under autarky raises the bene…t in the jurisdiction which
was less generous under autarky.
What does change are the bene…ts received by the unskilled population
in the two jurisdictions. Whatever di¤erences existed under autarky are
eliminated by the mobility of the unskilled. The unskilled gain in the poorer
country (measured by either the fraction unskilled, the productivity of the
skilled, the e¢ciency of the tax system–or any combination of these factors)
and lose in the richer jurisdiction. But there is no race to the bottom in
terms of systematic di¤erences in redistributive taxation between autarky
and complete openness.
Up to now we have assumed that the unskilled were mobile and did not
work. If instead the skilled workers were the mobile ones, it is intuitive to see
that they could have a strong incentive to conglomerate in the same location.
Piaser (2002) shows that in that particular case there is a full race to the
bottom: no redistribution. Similarly, if the unskilled were working then the
social objective would not be to maximize the demogrant but the utility of
the unskilled. Mobility would then matters.
3C o n c l u s i o n
While this analysis is quite simple, it serves to demonstrate several points
that have not always been clear in academic and popular discussions of tax
competition in open economies.
First, factor mobility creates …scal externalities, but one must be sure that
these externalities are relevant to the equilibrium outcome. Mobility of the
unskilled does not a¤ect the skilled because, under the Rawlsian criterion,
the taxes levied on the skilled do not depend on the size of the unskilled
population unless the constraint that us
i ¸ uu
i binds.
4Second, models in which both skilled and unskilled labor are mobile fac-
tors raise a number of technical issues, including the ”empty-community
problem”. Many researchers consider the simpler cases where only the skilled
or only the unskilled are mobile. Our result demonstrates that it may matter
crucially which is the mobile type. It is not always the case that similar
r e s u l t sh o l di nb o t hc a s e s .
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